Personaramic
Business and Decisions

Which Cognitive Biases Shape Your Money and Negotiation Decisions?

12 questions · ~2 min · No sign-up ·

Question 1 of 12 · cognitive bias test

The seller of a used car asks you for €14,500. Similar cars are listed at between €11,000 and €13,000. Where does your counteroffer come from?

More about this test

Cognitive biases are mental shortcuts that save us time but steer us, in predictable ways, away from the decision we would make with all the numbers in front of us. This test measures four of the ones that weigh most when money or a negotiation is involved:

  • Anchoring: the first figure you hear drags your estimate along with it.
  • Loss aversion: losing hurts more than gaining the same amount feels good.
  • Sunk cost: sticking with something because of what you have already put into it.
  • Endowment effect: valuing something more just because it's yours.

There are no theory questions: just 12 everyday scenarios with three options each, about 2 minutes. Choose what you would really do, not what you think a very rational person would do.

All possible results

Deliberate mind

In most scenarios you decided with today's numbers, without being swayed by the first figure, what was already spent or what was already yours.

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What this result describes

Your answers almost always steer clear of what the four biases predict. In Kahneman's terms, in these situations you let System 2 do the work: slow thinking, which compares and calculates, as opposed to the fast, intuitive System 1.

How it usually shows when negotiating

  • An extreme first offer doesn't shift your sense of value.
  • What you've already invested doesn't tie you to a bad deal.
  • You price what's yours according to the market, not your attachment.

"Biases don't disappear: they show less when there's time to look at the numbers."

The nuance

Answering a test calmly is not the same as deciding under pressure, in a hurry or when tired. Kahneman insisted that knowing about a bias barely protects you from it in the moment: what helps is recognizing the situations in which it tends to appear. Look at the breakdown: even with a low result, one of the four usually shows more than the others.

Mixed mind

Sometimes you decide with the numbers in hand and sometimes a bias carries you along. The breakdown shows which one influences you most.

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What this result describes

Your answers are split between biased and unbiased scenarios. This is the most expected pattern: the four biases are systematic, meaning they affect almost everyone, but not with the same strength or in every context.

How to read your breakdown

  • High anchoring: the first figure in a negotiation carries weight with you. Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) found that whoever makes the first offer tends to get a better deal, and that this advantage disappeared when the person receiving the offer focused on the other side's alternatives, on their reservation price or on their own target.
  • High loss aversion: you concede more easily when something is framed as a loss than as a gain.
  • High sunk cost: you find it hard to walk away from a long negotiation even when a better option exists.
  • High endowment effect: when you sell, your asking price tends to sit above the market.

"The bias that weighs most is usually the one that's hardest to see from the inside."

Intuitive mind

In many scenarios you took the quick shortcut: the first figure, what was already spent or what was already yours weighed more than today's numbers.

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What this result describes

Your answers often match what the four biases predict. In Kahneman's terms, System 1 (fast, automatic and emotional) took the lead. That isn't a flaw: it is the human brain's default mode, and it gets a great many everyday decisions right.

How it usually shows when negotiating

  • The first figure put on the table sets the playing field.
  • Giving up something you already had costs you more than it's worth.
  • A long negotiation ties you down, even when there's a better option.

"The shortcut isn't the problem. The problem is not knowing when you're taking it."

What the research says

In the mug experiment by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), people who were given a mug asked about twice as much to sell it as others were willing to pay for it. And in Arkes and Blumer's study (1985), people who had paid full price for a theater season ticket went to more performances during the first half of the season than those who had got it at a discount. Anchoring has been observed even in experienced real estate agents (Northcraft and Neale, 1987).

Indicative result. It describes tendencies based on what you answered today, not a fixed trait or a closed label. It is not a diagnosis.

How this test was built

What it measures

This test measures your exposure to four cognitive biases that are classics of behavioral economics, in money and negotiation situations: anchoring, loss aversion, sunk cost and the endowment effect.

What it does not mean

This result is not a diagnosis and does not measure your intelligence or your ability to reason.

Its limits

It is a self-report about imagined situations : what people say they would do does not always match what they do with real money.

See the full methodology

What it measures

This test measures your exposure to four cognitive biases that are classics of behavioral economics, in money and negotiation situations: anchoring, loss aversion, sunk cost and the endowment effect.

What model it uses

It is based on the research of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on heuristics and biases, and on their prospect theory (1979), which describes why losses weigh more than equivalent gains. Each bias is measured with three scenarios:

  • Anchoring: Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
  • Loss aversion: Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
  • Sunk cost: Arkes and Blumer (1985).
  • Endowment effect: Thaler (1980) and Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990).

Where that model comes from

These scenarios adapt the original experiments to everyday settings: Tversky and Kahneman's rigged wheel of fortune, the coin-toss bet with gains and losses, Arkes and Blumer's theater tickets, and the mugs of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, where people who were given a mug asked about twice as much to sell it as others were willing to pay.

How the result is calculated

There are 12 scenarios, three per bias, with three options: one free of the bias, one in between and one where the bias weighs fully. The overall result is your position from 0 to 100 on an exposure scale, with cut-offs at 30 and 70. The breakdown shows, for each bias, the average of your three answers.

What your result means

The result describes how closely your decisions match what these biases predict in specific situations. An intuitive result does not mean you decide badly in general: mental shortcuts are fast and often useful; they just fail in predictable ways in these cases.

What it does NOT mean

This result is not a diagnosis and does not measure your intelligence or your ability to reason. Nor is it financial advice: the investment, insurance and shopping scenarios are hypothetical and simplified, and in real life they depend on your particular financial situation.

Limitations

It is a self-report about imagined situations: what people say they would do does not always match what they do with real money. Some "biased" answers can be reasonable depending on the context (for example, turning down a bet if you can't afford to lose). With three scenarios per bias, the breakdown is only indicative. It is not a validated instrument.

Academic references

  • Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
  • Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.
  • Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1(1), 39-60.
  • Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35(1), 124-140.
  • Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990). Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1325-1348.
  • Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1987). Experts, amateurs, and real estate: An anchoring-and-adjustment perspective on property pricing decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39(1), 84-97.
  • Galinsky, A. D., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(4), 657-669.
  • Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

How we evaluate all our tests

Frequently asked questions

What are cognitive biases?

They are systematic deviations in judgment that occur when we use mental shortcuts (heuristics). The term was popularized by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman from 1974 onward. "Systematic" means they are not random errors: they repeat in the same direction and in almost everyone.

What is anchoring bias?

It is the tendency to let the first figure we hear drag our later estimate along with it, even when that figure is irrelevant. In the classic experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), a number from a rigged wheel of fortune influenced what percentage of UN member countries participants believed were African.

What is the sunk cost fallacy?

It is continuing to invest in something (money, time, effort) because of what has already been invested and can't be recovered, instead of deciding based on what lies ahead. It was described experimentally by Arkes and Blumer (1985).

What is the difference between loss aversion and the endowment effect?

Loss aversion is the general principle: a loss weighs more than a gain of the same size. The endowment effect is one of its consequences: because parting with something feels like a loss, what is ours seems more valuable than the same thing when it isn't ours.

Does an intuitive result mean I make bad decisions?

No. Fast thinking gets most daily decisions right. The test only measures situations in which that shortcut deviates in predictable ways, especially with money and negotiations.

See all 7 questions
Is this test financial advice?

No. The investment, insurance and shopping scenarios are hypothetical and simplified in order to measure biases. A real financial decision depends on your particular situation and, if it's an important one, on a qualified professional.

How long does it take, and is it free?

It has 12 scenarios and takes about 2 minutes. It is free, with no sign-up, and your answers are not stored or sent anywhere.